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   4.2. The “355-ship navy” and carrier strike force compositions
5. (Navy-oriented) foreword: “Tactics is the soul of our profession.” (Cebrowski)

B (Mostly Naval) Tactics: “Fire Effectively First!” (Hughes)

   6.1. Fighting sail tactics: ships-of-the-line, columns, shirkers, crossing the T, raking
   6.2. Why (mathematical) models? Game theory and war games
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      6.4.4. ... and a strategic implication: quantity or quality?
   6.5. The Lanchester (1916) (originally aerial combat) square law for continuous fire
      6.5.1. Solving the model
      6.5.2. The Fiske tactical implications
      6.5.3. Anecdotal evidence or empirical studies? Fighting sail; ground combat; COIN; aerial combat (“Flying Tigers”; Thach Weave; RAF doctrine)
   6.6. Lanchester’s law, the prequel: The Chase (1902) square law

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   8.1. Introduction to carrier warfare: welcome to the missile age
   8.2. A linear (infantry-style) combat model
   8.3. Screening and surprise: “Fire Effectively First!” yet again
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      8.4.1. Coral Sea: American tactical defeat ... but strategic victory (May 7-8, 1942)
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   8.5. Early WWII carrier tactical problems: massing or dispersal?

9. WWII carrier warfare from 1943 onwards
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10.2. Guadalcanal: Cactus and the Tokyo Express
10.3. “The Battle of the Five Sitting Ducks”: Savo Island (November 8-9, 1942)
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10.5. Lessons learned II: “Turn” instead of “corpen”; small TGs instead of large TF
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10.7. Battle of Okinawa: destroyer picket stations against kamikazes

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17. Naval strategy in the missile warfare age: risk levels and opportunity costs
18. Strategic blunders
18.2. Deployment of Soviet Foxtrot, Zulu submarines during the Cuban missile crisis (1962)
18.3. The Vietnam War: “The way to end this war is to win the damned thing.” (Olds)
18.5. Thatcher naval policy (1981): “The Royal Navy was to become a coast guard.” (Lehman)
18.6. The UK 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review ...
19. Is strategic planning obsolete? “Man plans, fate laughs ...”

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Recollections


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